Iran - The Window of Opportunity
“The window of opportunity is now,” stated a diplomat in reference to the Iranian nuclear situation. ( Hersh) The window is closing rapidly.
Given the aims of In the World, it may already be too late to tackle such a convoluted, intricate issue. On the other hand, the time for open and informed discussion on the subject has never been so critical. The possible outcome of the current diplomatic stand-off is potentially the greatest threat to international stability for decades to come.
We should remember not to let the good be the enemy of the ideal. Compromise necessarily means a less than perfect outcome for all parties.
Where is the ‘window’ and what does it look like?
What type of confidence-building measures can be envisioned?
Is it possible that both the U.S. Administration and the Iranian Government want a conflict (for vastly different reasons)?
more . . .
Nationalists in Iran - Patriots in the U.S.A.
The key players in this deadly game have not had official diplomatic relations since the 1980s. The current situation cannot be separated from the 1953 coup in Iran, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Hostage Crisis, the 1986 Iran-Contra scandal, the 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech, or the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The distrust between the U.S Administration and Iranian Government is equally deep and mutual.
The two parties and the international community looked to the EU3 (Britain, France, Germany) to broker a deal on the nuclear issue in October 2003. These talks were suspended indefinitely in early 2006 as Iran ended its voluntary moratorium on nuclear enrichment research – enrichment for civilian purposes is permitted by the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of which Iran is a signatory. Most recently, President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had been successful in uranium enrichment. It should be noted that this enrichment is only 3.5%, which remains largely insufficient for weapons grade material (90% enrichment). (see International Crisis Group)
On the one hand, Iran claims to be developing a purely civilian nuclear energy programme. On the other hand, Europeans and, especially, the U.S.A. claim that Iran lacks credibility given its previously undisclosed nuclear research. They fear that Iran is in fact developing a parallel military nuclear programme. Yet in August 2005, “the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued the Fatwa that the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.” (WW4) While the significance of such a religious edict is largely underplayed, this Fatwa alone cannot quiet the concerns of secular Western governments.
The problem for those suspicious of Iran’s intentions is the lack of objectively convincing evidence supporting the ‘clandestine nuclear programme thesis.’
The problem for those supportive of the Iranian position is the lack of objectively convincing evidence supporting the ‘no nuclear weapon thesis.’
Iraq
The Iraqi quagmire is far from resolved, yet the 2003 invasion has already established a legacy. The botched Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) argument has fundamentally increased the burden of proof necessary for future multilateral interventions. The war itself has sent a clear message to the Iranian leadership. One of the three original members of the “Axis of Evil”, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) is suspected to possess nuclear weapons and a second member, Iraq, was invaded. The third member, Iran, remains in limbo. Furthermore, the Iranian Government knows that the U.S. efforts at rebuilding Iraq require many resources (economic, military, and political) rendering direct intervention in Iran difficult and costly at best - thus nearly impossible. The U.S. also depends on the Iranian Government’s influence with Shia’a groups to bring peace and consensus to Iraq.
Existential Threats - Internal Legitimisation - Geopolitics
Nonetheless, the U.S. military remains strategically placed in areas surrounding Iran. ( see map in Oxford Research Group)
Recent Iranian military exercises have received coverage in Western media. Less documented are the U.S. “Naval tactical aircraft…flying simulated nuclear-weapons delivery missions…within range of Iranian costal radars.” ( Hersh)
In order to prevent factional divisions over domestic issues, governments often use an external threat to preserve general unity and to legitimize their policies and their power. This is the case with both Iran and the U.S.A. today. Sanctions could not only serve as an external basis for legitimization of the Iranian Government but they could also be a pretext for a regional re-grouping of extremist elements hostile to the West. Recently Iran’s Foreign Minister reminded the great powers to remember the past. “Political pressure on the Islamic Republic will have the reverse effect.” ( Kerala)
To the U.S. Administration, a nuclear Iran is a geopolitical challenge to their Middle East Policy and their control of the global oil supply. The weight of oil in the U.S. position should not be undermined.
To Iran, the U.S. Administration represents a potential existential threat and a genuine impediment to the Iranian regional hegemony of ages past.
Israel, the biggest recipient of U.S. aid, is thought to have 200 nuclear warheads but has never signed the NPT. When this is digested by Iranian nationalism, it only results in further resentment for Israel and greater animosity for the U.S.A., the country which currently underpins both Israel and the larger international order as a result of its economic and military might. Furthermore, the recent deal the U.S.A. signed with India, can easily be perceived as a double standard discriminating against Islam or Iran.
The Failure of Military Intervention (see Oxford Research Group)
While a full invasion of Iran is unlikely given the existing burdens weighing on the U.S. military, current talk mainly concerns strategic air strikes. It is well documented that such strikes would have to be numerous given the quantity of sites involved in the Iranian nuclear programme. The air strikes would also have to target many military sites, some of which are embedded in civilian areas, to eliminate the risk of retaliation. Whether the risk of retaliation can be fully eliminated is doubtful given Iranian nationalism, ties to Shia’as in Iraq, ties to Syria, ties to the Islamic Jihad in Israel and ties to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
As has been the case with Iraq, any kind of intervention in Iran is likely to embolden terrorist organisations and anti-Americanism in the region. The notion that such strikes would cause an implosion of the Iranian Government is extremely unlikely. Arguments that such an attack would enflame the region are quite compelling.
An attack by an external power is likely to bring unprecedented legitimacy to the Iranian Government. If there is currently no military nuclear programme in Iran, air strikes would bring strong support for the Iranian Government to begin one. This would ultimately require further strikes at a later date.
Deal-Breakers
To Iran, abandoning enrichment is unacceptable, especially given how much the President has made it an issue of national pride and, therefore, legitimacy. To the U.S. enrichment is unacceptable. Meanwhile Europeans, Russians, and the Chinese remain more ambiguous. Nonetheless, the two major parties are at an impasse.
Now that the issue has been transferred to the U.N. Security Council there is an additional problem of saving face. The Security Council would lose what authority it has by tolerating enrichment. Iran cannot freeze enrichment in the face of external pressure if the leadership is to retain legitimacy domestically.
Given the aims of In the World, it may already be too late to tackle such a convoluted, intricate issue. On the other hand, the time for open and informed discussion on the subject has never been so critical. The possible outcome of the current diplomatic stand-off is potentially the greatest threat to international stability for decades to come.
We should remember not to let the good be the enemy of the ideal. Compromise necessarily means a less than perfect outcome for all parties.
Where is the ‘window’ and what does it look like?
What type of confidence-building measures can be envisioned?
Is it possible that both the U.S. Administration and the Iranian Government want a conflict (for vastly different reasons)?
more . . .
Nationalists in Iran - Patriots in the U.S.A.
The key players in this deadly game have not had official diplomatic relations since the 1980s. The current situation cannot be separated from the 1953 coup in Iran, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Hostage Crisis, the 1986 Iran-Contra scandal, the 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech, or the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The distrust between the U.S Administration and Iranian Government is equally deep and mutual.
The two parties and the international community looked to the EU3 (Britain, France, Germany) to broker a deal on the nuclear issue in October 2003. These talks were suspended indefinitely in early 2006 as Iran ended its voluntary moratorium on nuclear enrichment research – enrichment for civilian purposes is permitted by the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of which Iran is a signatory. Most recently, President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had been successful in uranium enrichment. It should be noted that this enrichment is only 3.5%, which remains largely insufficient for weapons grade material (90% enrichment). (see International Crisis Group)
On the one hand, Iran claims to be developing a purely civilian nuclear energy programme. On the other hand, Europeans and, especially, the U.S.A. claim that Iran lacks credibility given its previously undisclosed nuclear research. They fear that Iran is in fact developing a parallel military nuclear programme. Yet in August 2005, “the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued the Fatwa that the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.” (WW4) While the significance of such a religious edict is largely underplayed, this Fatwa alone cannot quiet the concerns of secular Western governments.
The problem for those suspicious of Iran’s intentions is the lack of objectively convincing evidence supporting the ‘clandestine nuclear programme thesis.’
The problem for those supportive of the Iranian position is the lack of objectively convincing evidence supporting the ‘no nuclear weapon thesis.’
Iraq
The Iraqi quagmire is far from resolved, yet the 2003 invasion has already established a legacy. The botched Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) argument has fundamentally increased the burden of proof necessary for future multilateral interventions. The war itself has sent a clear message to the Iranian leadership. One of the three original members of the “Axis of Evil”, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) is suspected to possess nuclear weapons and a second member, Iraq, was invaded. The third member, Iran, remains in limbo. Furthermore, the Iranian Government knows that the U.S. efforts at rebuilding Iraq require many resources (economic, military, and political) rendering direct intervention in Iran difficult and costly at best - thus nearly impossible. The U.S. also depends on the Iranian Government’s influence with Shia’a groups to bring peace and consensus to Iraq.
Existential Threats - Internal Legitimisation - Geopolitics
Nonetheless, the U.S. military remains strategically placed in areas surrounding Iran. ( see map in Oxford Research Group)
Recent Iranian military exercises have received coverage in Western media. Less documented are the U.S. “Naval tactical aircraft…flying simulated nuclear-weapons delivery missions…within range of Iranian costal radars.” ( Hersh)
In order to prevent factional divisions over domestic issues, governments often use an external threat to preserve general unity and to legitimize their policies and their power. This is the case with both Iran and the U.S.A. today. Sanctions could not only serve as an external basis for legitimization of the Iranian Government but they could also be a pretext for a regional re-grouping of extremist elements hostile to the West. Recently Iran’s Foreign Minister reminded the great powers to remember the past. “Political pressure on the Islamic Republic will have the reverse effect.” ( Kerala)
To the U.S. Administration, a nuclear Iran is a geopolitical challenge to their Middle East Policy and their control of the global oil supply. The weight of oil in the U.S. position should not be undermined.
To Iran, the U.S. Administration represents a potential existential threat and a genuine impediment to the Iranian regional hegemony of ages past.
Israel, the biggest recipient of U.S. aid, is thought to have 200 nuclear warheads but has never signed the NPT. When this is digested by Iranian nationalism, it only results in further resentment for Israel and greater animosity for the U.S.A., the country which currently underpins both Israel and the larger international order as a result of its economic and military might. Furthermore, the recent deal the U.S.A. signed with India, can easily be perceived as a double standard discriminating against Islam or Iran.
The Failure of Military Intervention (see Oxford Research Group)
While a full invasion of Iran is unlikely given the existing burdens weighing on the U.S. military, current talk mainly concerns strategic air strikes. It is well documented that such strikes would have to be numerous given the quantity of sites involved in the Iranian nuclear programme. The air strikes would also have to target many military sites, some of which are embedded in civilian areas, to eliminate the risk of retaliation. Whether the risk of retaliation can be fully eliminated is doubtful given Iranian nationalism, ties to Shia’as in Iraq, ties to Syria, ties to the Islamic Jihad in Israel and ties to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
As has been the case with Iraq, any kind of intervention in Iran is likely to embolden terrorist organisations and anti-Americanism in the region. The notion that such strikes would cause an implosion of the Iranian Government is extremely unlikely. Arguments that such an attack would enflame the region are quite compelling.
An attack by an external power is likely to bring unprecedented legitimacy to the Iranian Government. If there is currently no military nuclear programme in Iran, air strikes would bring strong support for the Iranian Government to begin one. This would ultimately require further strikes at a later date.
Deal-Breakers
To Iran, abandoning enrichment is unacceptable, especially given how much the President has made it an issue of national pride and, therefore, legitimacy. To the U.S. enrichment is unacceptable. Meanwhile Europeans, Russians, and the Chinese remain more ambiguous. Nonetheless, the two major parties are at an impasse.
Now that the issue has been transferred to the U.N. Security Council there is an additional problem of saving face. The Security Council would lose what authority it has by tolerating enrichment. Iran cannot freeze enrichment in the face of external pressure if the leadership is to retain legitimacy domestically.
posted by Germain at 22:04
2 Comments:
It seems perhaps, that when the dust settles, the battle for hegemony in the Middle East will be won on ideals, nor on realpolitik. In fact, maybe nothing will be won. Losers in international politics do not walk quietly into the horizon. And an invaded Iran could be the worst of all worlds for Middle Eastern peace.
The US may be able to militarily subdue the Iranian government; but how would US promote their ideology of nuclear pacificm in the wake of Israel's nuclear arms, or promote western-stylized democracy in a region which has given Hamas a whirl at governance. But picture an Iran without central order or governance; this might diffuse the challenger but this comes with the cost of diffuse the disorder as well. And this diffusion can be like bombs falling across borders like dominoes.
Germain raises a good point of lack of diplomatic communications between Iran and the US. It points to an inability of war to solve anything. The window of opportunity here is maybe to realize that aggression in Iraq has promoted the inevitable cycle of arms-race, nationalism and insecurity. And that aggression in Iran may be a tipping point.
"Who knows who knows what in Iran"
is a quote my Western friend loves to make about places where internal decisions are hard to speculate on. It's vaguely similar to Rumsfeld's now well known adage about the the fog of war (on terrorism). But it's worth repeating.
Maybe we might see a clash of words, of assymetric scuffling, shows of strength, anything to bolster either sides' political capital, which is also fed by rhetoric. This rhetoric gives the US and the neo-cons more reason than ever to remain "involved". It also gives Iran more reason to crack down on dissidents.
I won't suggest now who will be the winner or loser. However the match lit here on this issue, may be the spark for something outside of all current parties control.
I know everyone cries "wolf" with each new Middle Easern issue, and I'm no expert myself, but permit me a few words in in what will inevitably be an inchoate conclusion. Regional state balance in a new, post-nuclear Iran order would seem to tilter between the cusp of either nuclear war or the rise of a new facism/statism. Whilst regional balance in a post-Iran invasion might be non-existent.
I agree, an invaded Iran will do nothing but to bring greater instability (yes, it IS possible) to the region and the world. I do not know how seriously each of President Ahmadinejad’s words should be taken, but his threat of reprisals to US interests throughout the world is far from beyond the scope of his reach.
As for the balance evoked in a post-nuclear Iran, I am sceptical of the claim that this could provide a basis for nuclear war. India and Pakistan hate(d) each other in a manner similar to Israel and Iran...the threat of deterrence in S. Asia brought the two parties to the table, could it have the same affect in the Middle East? I will be making a post on this same topic shortly.
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