I think they're gonna talk!
So Iran has said it wants to talk, but won't suspend its enrichment activities... Clearly America won't be happy with that, but Iran would have lost face if it had just dropped enrichment as soon as the US said it was willing to talk. I'm guessing we'll see a gradual shifting of positions over the next little while, probably involving some sort of "temporary" suspension from Iran so they can sit down together. Then we'll see what happens.
Doesn't it feel great to have moved just a tiny bit further away from a war?
Doesn't it feel great to have moved just a tiny bit further away from a war?
posted by Peter at 08:16
10 Comments:
Have we?
Well that all depends on whether you think the Americans are being genuine or not. They knew Iran would not suspend but they may think that this sign of American goodwill will help get international support for sanctions. The problem is that this position kind of takes the rest of us for idiots as it assumes we would not understand that Iran COULD NOT suspend simply because the US asked them to.
I agree with Peter, this opens the door ( or window) for a gradual progression towards dialogue, provided both main parties (ie- the ones who think the other is a direct threat to them) act responsibly.
Hmmm. "Moved further away..." Perhaps it depends on the way you see future time - as already out there and waiting to happen, or as still undefined... If there's gonna be a war in the future, we are moving inexorably closer to it with each passing second, and if there's not then we've always been equally distant from it. But I somehow doubt that was the thrust of Kevin's question.
Offering to talk, and even actual talking, could help legitimise an eventual war by demonstrating that all possibilities have been exhausted. However I don't think it's yet a case of "we've made our minds up, now let's work out how to justify it." Talks instead of war are very sensible given the USA's other commitments, not just in terms of troops but also reconstruction money. This article http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1790499,00.html
suggests that Haditha was a result of the marines' overexposure to combat and stress, while also raising concerns about the US public's appetite for war. In these circumstances another adventure just doesn't seem feasible.
I think perhaps the issue highlights one of the repeated generalized (generalised for Pete) differences between Americans and Europeans on matters of diplomacy. In general (i.e. not always but more often than not), Americans see more nontrivial distance between words and action. Some Europeans even seem to see the two as synonymous. What I was suggesting is that while words and gestures aren't meaningless they are cheap, and I'm not convinced the situation has moved at all in any direction. I want to see what people do. And if it has moved, it's not at all clear to me in what direction or toward what end it has moved. Wow, that's a lot of unpacking for two words and one punctuation mark.
“The only thing that is worse than a war with Iran is this Iranian regime armed with a nuclear weapon.” - John McCain, US Republican Senator, (2005)
Will the United States bomb Iran in the next two years?
As hard as it is to say anything about the future with any hope of accuracy the direction that events appear to be heading seems bleak. There is a growing polarisation between the rhetoric coming out of Tehran and Washington that can only make war more likely. Ahmadinejad is a particularly unpleasant and dangerous man who needs to be stopped. The Western powers simply cannot allow him to be in control of nuclear weapons. It is that simple.
People who argue that Iran has a right to build a bomb because Israel has got one are completely missing the point. More unfortunately, those who reject war as a matter of principle are also wrong. Nearly 200 years ago a Prussian general wrote that war was the continuation of politics by other means. Sadly, the world has not moved on in the last two centuries and his principle holds true today. Conflict is an inherent and very real aspect of the human existence. In a case like this, if diplomacy fails then governments have no other option but to go to war – however peaceful or principled their society is. So we come to the question of why does diplomacy seem to be failing and the chance of war growing with every day? I’m sorry to say this, but I feel strongly that if Iran is attacked it will be their own fault. The claim that they are only developing civilian nuclear power is a lie. I am astounded that more people haven’t woken up to this already. If they are lying about this, what else are they lying about? These people can’t be trusted and they must be stopped. Our quarrel is not with the Iranian people - it is with their government – but it looks to me like an argument that can only end in a war. If conflict is indeed inevitable, we should not wait 2 years before attacking – we should bomb them tomorrow.
I think the greatest issue with all of this is the consequences. On Saturday (6th May), a British helicopter was shot down in central Basra. Five soldiers were killed. If we do bomb Iran, the military situation in Iraq and Afghanistan will change dramatically for the worse, at least in the short-term. In this country, we are being spun a line by the government about the situation in these two countries that is inaccurate and there really are very few people in this country (at least relative to the rest to the population) who know what’s going on there.
Assuming that the Iranians haven’t already built a bomb and so don’t have a ‘deterrent’ capability (e.g. North Korea), Iran’s greatest threat is to mine a stretch of water called the Strait of Hormuz (which links the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean). Something like 60/70% of the West’s crude oil and natural gas supplies have to be moved by ship through this passage of water. If they manage to block it, it would cause major economic chaos throughout the world. We simply would not be able to afford to drive our cars long distances anymore. At £3 a litre of petrol, it would cost me over £100 to drive back to Bath! However scary this threat might be, there is an irony here. If the greatest threat to our society is ‘Climate Change’ (a very strong possibility), bombing Iran would help. People would stop using their cars and we would suddenly find it rather easy to meet our carbon emissions targets!
I’m not saying I want to bomb Iran - although, as events unfold, I am clearly moving in that direction. I’m trying to think long-term about what is best for this country, its people, and its interests. It is supposed to be hard-headed realism. We also have to face the possibility that we are already at war. The question is: can we win?
This is from a transcript of a debate at Chatham House (Royal Institute for International Affairs) that was held on 30 March this year.
US Military Action Against Iran:
Hype or Possibility?
'Professor Clawson' is:
Dr Patrick Clawson, Deputy Director for Research, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy
I have the full transcript if anyone wants to read it but you might be able to get it on the Chatham House website which is: www.chathamhouse.org.uk
Professor Clawson turned to consider what form any preventative military action would
take should it occur. He addressed the argument that the engagement of the US military
in neighbouring Iraq rendered US military action in Iran impossible: on the contrary, whilst
the US army and marine corps were currently occupied in Iraq, the air-force and the navy
were, relatively speaking, free and keen to prove their use. Secondly, he addressed the
argument that the impact of any strikes would be restricted by the underground location
of key Iranian installations. Studies of Iran’s nuclear programme had determined that it
depended upon a chain of installations including certain key ‘nodes’ which would be
vulnerable to attack: a military strike would target the weak links in the chain not the
strong links. However, surgical strikes would be impossible since Iran’s inevitable
retaliation would undoubtedly lead to war. This would clearly be highly costly and would
not be engaged in lightly. Indeed he stressed that the full diplomatic process would
undoubtedly be played out before such attacks were considered and it seemed most
likely that covert action would be employed first. By way of illustration, he pointed out that
the nuclear programme, being composed of highly specialised industrial processes and
reliant upon sophisticated computer equipment, might be vulnerable to computer viruses.
Regarding the possibility of regime change in Iran, Professor Clawson pointed out that,
whilst the US had favoured regime change in Cuba for the last 45 years but
accomplished relatively little, it had recently announced a series of initiatives to
encourage regime change in Iran. The US government currently allocated considerable
funds to initiatives aimed at encouraging regime change in Iran. These include measures
such as Persian language websites, the Voice of America radio broadcasts and a number
of University scholarships for study abroad. Professor Clawson said that these initiatives
totalled $65 million with the rest of the funds being allocated to human rights groups.
Such policies, he said, were clearly appropriate in moral terms and would doubtless
continue with or without the nuclear issue.
Professor Clawson commented that the US was known internationally as a ‘busybody’ for
its criticism of those states with poor human rights records and suggested that this would
continue. He closed his remarks with a reminder of the unpredictability of change in
international politics. President Regan’s 1987 speech demanding the dismantling of the
Berlin Wall had met with widespread derision yet subsequent events had demonstrated
the difficulty of predicting the pace of developments in international politics. He
commented that there was no way of accurately predicting a revolution or the pace of
change.
Dear Henry,
Thank you for the comment.
While you state that the comparison with Israel misses the point, you fail to explain why. More importantly, ignoring this aspect (and the Bush deal with India) is like ignoring the fact that Iran is virtually surrounded by the US military, it simply overlooks essential elements playing into the Iranian psyche and rhetoric.
On your point regarding conflict as inherent to the human condition, I think the European project shows that countries with a history of war and mutual disdain can ban together for peace…and it only took us 50 years. This is not to deny that conflict has not, does not, and will not exist, but merely to affirm that that there is not reason why conflict MUST necessarily exist. Peace is possible, not all countries or people are in conflict…
I am surprised that you feel diplomacy has been failing, the past week has presented quite a new set of positive consensual possibilities but it will take tough concessions from everyone ( such concessions necessarily outweigh 30,000 more casualties, or $300billion ( civil society recently called out for an additional $12billion to successfully fight AIDS which killed 2.8million in 2005; our priorities would be a bit confusing to a Martian)).
Which proof do you have that Iran is developing nuclear weapons? Hasn’t the doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ shown its heinous price? Lets reverse your own logic ‘If Bush/Blair lied about WMD ( wire taps and Haditha), what else are they lying about?’ (I know Blair had nothing to do with wire taps and Haditha…)
I am not sure you fully appreciate the consequences of bombing Iran tomorrow, if you think Iraq is tough, just wait (especially since Iran, being Shia’a, can play quite a destabilising role in Iraq). There has been no better recruitment campaign for terrorist organisations than Iraq. Take a look at Afghanistan, even Kabul is no longer stabilized. Did you notice the protest in Pakistan in favour of Iran and against the US a few days ago? They are probably getting tired of being bombed. How about Iran’s ties to Islamic Jihad? There is not better way to consolidate support for the Iranian government than to bomb them.
Is using nuclear bunker busters ( which are necessary given the depth of Iran’s facilities) to bomb potentially unstable nuclear sites really THE solution to climate change? Especially since the EU is already meeting its Kyoto targets.
We are not already at war. What we are living now compared to the potential consequences of a true war is nothing. Think of the emboldened terrorists, the potential implosion of the Middle East and its consequences for the people there and everywhere in the world. I do not believe a French, British, or American life is worth any more than an Iranian, Iraqi, or Syrian life. We, as the West (which like to call itself the ‘international community’), have the power to save lives throughout the world, it is our responsibility to do so rather than simply thinking of ‘this country, its people, and its interest.’ But it is equally important to recognize the limits of our power and resources.
About the possibility and results of air strikes, I refer you to Oxford Research Group .
While we like to defend liberal principles, I think we often take for granted how difficult it is to forcefully and successfully (including long-term success, think of the Shah) change a regime. We also ignore the difficulty of changing a society such that is democratizes (though in the case of Iran this is not an issue as they already are democratic even if not a ‘liberal democracy’, a term which itself is progressively being brought to contradiction by supposed laws against ‘terrorism’). If we are unable to pass difficult reforms in our own countries, where we share culture and history and control the state fully, how can we think for an instant that we have a ability to change a regime or instil liberal values? We really are dangerously convinced of our own capabilities.
Thankyou germain for your response. You might not believe it, but i actually agree with alot of what you say. There are some points of mine that need to be made clearer (e.g. Israel's bomb) but I'm tired and need to go to bed (I have an exam on thursday).
In place of a proper reply...
A Nuclear Test for Diplomacy
By Henry A. Kissinger
Washington Post, Tuesday, May 16, 2006; A17
The world is faced with the nightmarish prospect that nuclear weapons will become a standard part of national armament and wind up in terrorist hands. The negotiations on Korean and Iranian nuclear proliferation mark a watershed. A failed diplomacy would leave us with a choice between the use of force or a world where restraint has been eroded by the inability or unwillingness of countries that have the most to lose to restrain defiant fanatics. One need only imagine what would have happened had any of the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington, London, Madrid, Istanbul or Bali involved even the crudest nuclear weapon…
With respect to Iran, there isn't even a formal agreement on what the objective is. Iran has refused to agree to international control over its uranium enrichment program, in the absence of which no control over a weapons program is meaningful.
Until now formal negotiations have been prevented by the memory of the hostage crisis, Iranian support of terrorist groups and the aggressive rhetoric of the Iranian president. Nor does the Iranian president's letter remove these inhibitions. Nevertheless, on a matter so directly involving its security, the United States should not negotiate through proxies, however closely allied. If America is prepared to negotiate with North Korea over proliferation in the six-party forum, and with Iran in Baghdad over Iraqi security, it must be possible to devise a multilateral venue for nuclear talks with Tehran that would permit the United States to participate -- especially in light of what is at stake…
An indefinite continuation of the stalemate would amount to a de facto acquiescence by the international community in letting new entrants into the nuclear club. In Asia, it would spell the near-certain addition of South Korea and Japan; in the Middle East, countries such as Turkey, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia could enter the field. In such a world, all significant industrial countries would consider nuclear weapons an indispensable status symbol. Radical elements throughout the Islamic world and elsewhere would gain strength from the successful defiance of the major nuclear powers.
The management of a nuclear-armed world would be infinitely more complex than maintaining the deterrent balance of two Cold War superpowers. The various nuclear countries would not only have to maintain deterrent balances with their own adversaries, a process that would not necessarily follow the principles and practices evolved over decades among the existing nuclear states. They would also have the ability and incentives to declare themselves as interested parties in general confrontations. Especially Iran, and eventually other countries of similar orientation, would be able to use nuclear arsenals to protect their revolutionary activities around the world.
There is an argument on behalf of acquiescing in proliferation which holds that new nuclear countries have proved responsible in the past. But this is not endorsed by experience. Pakistan proliferated its nuclear technology through the A.Q. Khan project; North Korea has been an active proliferator. In addition, the safeguarding of nuclear material on the territories of emerging nuclear countries is bound to be more porous and less sophisticated.
Diplomacy needs a new impetus. As a first step, the United States and its negotiating partners need to agree on how much time is available for negotiations. There seems to be general agreement that Pyongyang is producing enough plutonium for several weapons a year; there is some disagreement about progress in producing actual operational weapons in the absence of testing. Estimates on how close Tehran is to producing its first nuclear weapon range from two to 10 years. Given the risks and stakes, this gap needs to be narrowed. Any consideration of diplomatic pace must take account of the fact that in 2008 governments in both Russia and the United States will change; this will impose a hiatus on diplomacy while the governments are preoccupied with transition and, in America, restaffing the executive branch.
The next step is to recognize the difference between multiparty negotiations and a preferred strategy of regime change. There are no governments in the world whose replacement by responsible regimes would contribute more to international peace and security than those governing Pyongyang and Tehran. But none of the participants in the existing or foreseeable forums will support a policy explicitly aiming for regime change. Inevitably, a negotiation on nuclear disarmament will involve compensation in security and economic benefits in return for abandonment of nuclear weapons capabilities and is, in that sense, incompatible with regime change.
Focusing on regime change as the road to denuclearization confuses the issue. The United States should oppose nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran regardless of the government that builds them.
The diplomacy appropriate to denuclearization is comparable to the containment policy that helped win the Cold War: no preemptive challenge to the external security of the adversary, but firm resistance to attempts to project its power abroad and reliance on domestic forces to bring about internal change. It was precisely such a nuanced policy that caused President Ronald Reagan to invite Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to a dialogue within weeks of labeling the Soviet Union as the evil empire.
Though America is represented in the six-party forum by an exceptional diplomat in Christopher Hill, periodic engagement at a higher level is needed to give the necessary direction to his efforts. The objective should be an understanding regarding security and political evolution in Northeast Asia that requires no changes in sovereignty as part of the process of denuclearization but leaves open the prospect of Korean unification through negotiations or internal evolution.
Parallel considerations apply to the case of Iran. The current negotiating forum is highly dysfunctional. Three European countries in close coordination with the United States are acting partly as America's surrogate. China and Russia do not participate in the negotiations but are involved when their consequences go before the U.N. Security Council -- a procedure enabling Iran to play off the nuclear powers against each other.
A more coherent forum for negotiation would combine the three European nations with the United States, China and Russia as the countries most directly affected and in the best position to act jointly in the Security Council. This could be set up after the passage of the Security Council resolution now under discussion. It would permit elaboration of the one hopeful scheme that has emerged in Iranian diplomacy. Put forward by Russia, it is to move certain enrichment operations out of Iran into Russia, thereby preventing clandestine weaponization. The new, broader forum could be used to establish an international enrichment program applicable to future nuclear technologies to curb the looming specter of unchecked proliferation.
Obviously, nuclear proliferation cannot be prevented simply by multiplying negotiating forums. The experience with existing conferences demonstrates the capacity for procrastination and obfuscation. To be effective, diplomacy must involve a willingness to provide clear penalties for obstruction.
Only after we have created the requisite negotiating framework and explored all aspects of diplomacy should the issue of military measures be addressed. But neither should force be rejected in principle and for all time before we know the circumstances in which this last resort should be considered.
The issue before the nations involved is similar to what the world faced in 1938 and at the beginning of the Cold War: whether to overcome fears and hesitancy about undertaking the difficult path demanded by necessity. The failure of that test in 1938 produced a catastrophic war; the ability to master it in the immediate aftermath of World War II led to victory without war.
The debates surrounding these issues will be conducted in the waning years of an American adm1inistration. On the surface, this may seem to guarantee partisanship. But thoughtful observers in both parties will know that the consequences of the decisions before us will have to be managed in a new administration. The nuclear issue, capable of destroying mankind, may thus, one hopes, bring us together in the end.
© 2006 Tribune Media Services Inc.
This is all quite fascinating. No time to comment fully but I think the issue of general nuclear proliferation is key and hasn't had enough space on the blog so far. I think it's important that something's done about it, but the West needs to be more careful about its attitude than it has been.
By Sara Daniel and Vincent Jauvert
Le Nouvel Observateur
Week of Thursday 16 March 2006
The Islamic Republic at the UN Security Council
Is the prospect of an Iranian atomic bomb inevitable? How soon? What would the consequences be for the Middle East? And what can the international community still do?
1) What is known about the Iranian nuclear program?
We know that this program has existed for almost twenty years, that it remained totally clandestine until 2002 and that some part of it - the scope of which no one knows - is still secret. Thanks to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), we also know:
1) that Iran produces small quantities of plutonium in research laboratories.
2) that it is (almost) capable of converting uranium into gas and has the ability to do that on a large scale at Ispahan.
3) that Teheran has acquired or built several hundred machines designed to enrich that gas: the famous centrifuges that produce, according to their configuration, either fuel for an electric power station or fissile matter for an atomic bomb.
4) that the Islamic Republic intends to install tens of thousands of centrifuges in Natanz soon, but that Iranian engineers have not yet mastered the know-how required for them to run smoothly.
5) that the Iranian Army is testing medium range missiles, potentially capable of propelling a nuclear load for over 1,000 kilometers.
Virtually anything else is nothing but a theory.
2) Is this program necessarily military?
Teheran repeats that its objective is civilian: that it's all about producing electricity. "Why reject this explanation totally?" asks Bruno Tertrais, from the Foundation for Strategic Research. "The country is overflowing with oil and gas, but those resources will be exhausted. Consequently, it's not absurd for a big nation like Iran to plan for post-hydrocarbons. The Shah already had that idea ..." But it appears that it's something else. "Even if there is no formal proof, the clues to the principally military character of this program are numerous and corroborating," says Pascal Boniface, Director of the Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS). In the main, there's the secrecy that has surrounded this matter for so long. Teheran's refusal to fully cooperate with the IAEA, its connections with the network of Abdul Qadeer Khan, father of the Pakistani bomb, and the traces of highly enriched uranium the inspectors have found on several machines. But for the specialists, the most troubling indicator is the recent discovery by the UN agency of plans for the construction of half-hemispheres made out of uranium metal. In fact, there is no known usage for such pieces up till now that is not military. According to the IAEA, these half-hemispheres fit into the composition of the bomb's "explosive heart."
"Thus, in all probability, Iran is looking to provide itself with the means to build an atomic bomb," says Bruno Tertrais, "but nothing proves that the political decision to actually build that bomb has been taken. Teheran wants to imitate Japan and not cross the nuclear "threshold" - that is, to reach the technical and industrial level that would allow it to produce a weapon in several months, if necessary." However a number of experts believe that the Islamic Republic wants to cross that "threshold" and that the American decision to invade Iraq has only strengthened its determination.
3) How long would it take for Iran to produce an atomic weapon?
The scenarios vary a great deal according to the experts and the circumstances. From 1995 to last summer, American secret services asserted on several occasions that Iran would have an atomic bomb "within five years," in other words, a deadline that has already been overshot several times. In August 2005, to general surprise, they "leaked" a new estimate: ten years, or 2015. Why such an extension? The spies justify their caution by the fact that the Iranian enrichment program encountered numerous difficulties and that Teheran would not have enough fissile material before "the beginning of the next decade." A further deadline that could also be interpreted as a confession of impotence: being tied down in the Iraq war would make any American military action against Iran impossible for some years from now, in any case. Several American and European specialists bet on a nearer date: 2009 or 2010, without bringing any more evidence to bear.
4) Must we prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons?
According to IAEA Director and Nobel Peace prize winner Mohamed El Baradei, we must "stop thinking that it's morally unacceptable for certain countries to want nuclear weapons and morally acceptable for others to lean on them for their defense." But since the June 2005 election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who proclaims his desire to wipe Israel off the map, the West distrusts the true intentions of the Islamic Republic more than ever. And for most analysts, a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by Teheran would also risk bringing about a very worrying proliferation dynamic in the Middle East. Iran's nuclearization could also revive the atomic ambitions of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, even Turkey and establish the definitive failure of international non-proliferation agreements.
5) Why have the negotiations undertaken by the Europeans failed?
In 2003, France, Germany and Great Britain engaged in negotiations with Iran for two principle reasons. On the one hand, the Europeans were - and remain - worried about the constantly increasing reach of Iranian missiles with a potential nuclear capacity, missiles that could hit London, Paris, or Berlin one day. On the other hand, right in the middle of the American war in Iraq, the European troika wanted to prove to the world that proliferation problems can be settled diplomatically. After two and a half years of discussions, the failure is bitter. Certainly Iran has suspended its most sensitive activities on two occasions and consequently apparently lost a little time. But several experts assert that these voluntary stoppages were more due to technical problems than the skill of European negotiators. Last July, the troika made a global offer to the Islamic Republic: in exchange for the cessation of its enrichment activities and the opening of all its atomic sites and archives to IAEA inspectors, Europe would furnish it with light water nuclear plants (which do not risk being hijacked for military purposes), would support its candidacy at the WTO, and renew big trade negotiations that had been abandoned at the beginning of the nuclear crisis. But Teheran rejected this proposition out of hand. Why? "It's simple: the two parties' red lines are not compatible," explains Bruno Tertrais. "Iran wants to promote nuclear enrichment, which the Europeans want to absolutely prohibit it from doing." There is, it seems, another reason. "The Americans did not want to participate in these negotiations and offer the Iranians what might have convinced them: the lifting of the embargo they've imposed on Teheran since 1979 and the assurance that they won't attack them," adds Pascal Boniface. Whatever the case, to try to overcome the impasse, Moscow submitted an intermediate solution in November 2005 that was accepted by the West and China: the creation of an Irano-Russian company that would operate in Russia under IAEA control. New rejection by Teheran, which vociferously declares its desire to perform enrichment on its own soil. All diplomatic paths having been, in their estimation, exhausted, the Iranians announced at the beginning of 2006 that they were resuming their sensitive activities, suspended a few months earlier, including the construction of centrifuges. A slap in the face for Europe and the whole diplomatic community.
6) What can the Security Council do?
Probably not much. Last week, after multiple threats, the IAEA consequently transferred the Iranian case to the United Nations' supreme decision-making body, the Security Council. Motive: Teheran's multiple breaches of its obligations as a signatory to the Non-proliferation Treaty. That's an apparent victory for the United States, which has loudly demanded this transfer for nearly three years. But what new stage can it attain?
The fifteen members of the Security Council will probably first launch a solemn - but not comminatory - appeal at Iran. Then, if Teheran persists, will come the time for sanctions. "The Council will only be able to take limited measures," explains Bruno Tertrais, "such as restrictions on the movements of Iranian leaders or the freezing of their accounts abroad." For there is good reason to bet that two permanent members will not want to go further than that. Russia, on the one hand, has just sold surface to air missiles to Iran and is negotiating, among other things, the supply of fighter planes. Moscow also fears the destabilization of its southern border in the case of a serious crisis with the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, there's China, which is getting ready to sign a gigantic oil and gas contract with Teheran that is indispensable for its pursuit of economic growth.
The United States will undoubtedly also not seek to move towards the use of force. Scalded by the Iraqi fiasco of beginning 2003, it wants to preserve the - very fragile - unity of the international community with regard to this case. In fact, only Europe - or almost only - envisages taking more severe measures with respect to Teheran. For several months, France and Great Britain have been reflecting upon establishing a battery of "targeted" sanctions that "would spare" the Iranian people. They would only affect the nuclear program, the Guardians of the Revolution and the regime's leaders. But no one can predict the impact of such measures. Under pressure, Iranian leaders could decide to accelerate their race to the bomb rather than slow it down.
7) Is military action against Iran conceivable?
Stuck in the Iraqi quagmire, the United States does not really contemplate this eventuality - at least not in the short term. But while the British Foreign Affairs Minister excludes it "under any circumstances," Washington obviously wants to be able to brandish this threat. "Only one thing would be worse than military intervention: that Iran possess nuclear weapons," repeats Republican Senator John McCain. Consequently, Pentagon strategists make known that they are working on scenarios for an attack on Iranian nuclear sites. That could come from B-2 Stealth bombers stationed in Missouri or from the attack submarines that cross through the region. As long as it doesn't come from Israel: Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, who originally came from Iran, has declared that "under no circumstances could Israel tolerate Iran being in possession of nuclear weapons." The Israelis assert that they have all the firepower necessary for these preventative strikes. But questions remain about the range of action of the Hebrew state's bombers.
In fact, a military operation would only serve to delay the Iranian program, not to destroy it. For the Iranians learned their lessons from the 1981 bombardment of Osirak in Iraq: they have dispersed and buried their installations. Only the Ispahan conversion factory is situated far from an urban center and seems to be little protected. On top of that, the consequences of such an operation could prove to be catastrophic for the region's stability. Iran could counter-attack by launching its Shahab missiles against Israel and American bases in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic could also stir up the sectarian war in Iraq and organize a Shiite uprising against American troops. It could also re-launch Hezbollah attacks against Israel's north. As for the closing of the Strait of Hormuz through which close to 25% of the world's oil transits, that would make the price per barrel explode ...
8) How far is the Iranian state prepared to go?
If tensions exist between the different decision-making bodies of the Iranian government, the nuclear question unifies more than it divides. There's even a consensus in the country on this subject. "Even those who are opposed to nuclear weapons, including the lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize winner Chirin Ebadi, defend Iran's right to civilian nuclear technology," says Pascal Boniface. But that is not to say that there is unanimity with respect to the manner of conducting negotiations. Three attitudes are perceptible within Teheran's power circles. There are those who favor pursuit of the nuclear program whatever the cost. This first group includes president Ahmadinejad and the "Kayan" journal which has always maintained that Iran should quit the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The second group, represented by Ali Larjani, the head of the Iranian nuclear issues negotiators, believe that the pursuit of the nuclear cycle "is Iran's inalienable right," but would like to continue the negotiations within the framework of international treaties. For the third group, which is also the most marginal, the costs of pursuing the nuclear cycle outweigh its advantages. That group also supports a direct dialogue with the United States. Former president Rafsandjani could share that point of view. The great unknown remains: the position of Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, the ultimate decision-maker on the nuclear issue.
Whatever the case, the nuclear arm-wrestling contest is but one symptom of Iran's new ambitions. The Americans being bogged down in Iraq and the increase in the price of gas allow Teheran to claim loud and clear its status as a regional power. All the more so in that Iran has seen its position strengthened by its enemies' (Saddam Hussein's and the Taliban's) defeat and by its friends' victories (the Shiites in Iraq's elections, Hamas in Palestine). Persuaded that a confrontation with America is inevitable, the Iranian president prefers to precipitate this confrontation while the balance of power is in his favor. According to the International Crisis Group, "We are not at the beginning of a conflict between Iran and the United States, but in the middle of this conflict which comprises the theatres of Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel."
Chronology of the Iranian Crisis
August 2002: A group of Iranian exiles asserts that Iran is secretly constructing two nuclear sites. Satellite photos confirm their statements.
December 2002: Iran agrees to IAEA inspections.
June 2003: The IAEA accuses Iran of not revealing the extent of its nuclear program.
October 2003: After a meeting with the French, German, and British Foreign Affairs Ministers, Iran agrees to suspend its nuclear enrichment activities.
September 2004: Iran resumes its uranium conversion activities. The IAEA demands that it stop.
November 2004: Iran agrees to suspend its activities while it begins negotiations with the three European countries.
August 2005: The new Iranian president rejects the European offer. The Ispahan enrichment factory starts up again.
September 2005: Very hard IAEA report against Iran.
November 2005: Moscow makes another proposal, also rejected by Teheran.
January 2006: Iran resumes its sensitive activities.
March 9, 2006: the IAEA transmits the case to the Security Council.
________________________________________
Translation: t r u t h o u t French language correspondent Leslie Thatcher.
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/032106E.shtml
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