Lessons from the past...
Europe can tell Israel how punishing civilians backfires
By Mark Mazower
Yes I know I am an FT freak, but its quite an excellent paper...
Published: July 16 2006 18:51 | Last updated: July 16 2006 18:51
In 1949, Europeans spearheaded an international move to outlaw collective punishment. This came after two world wars in which they had witnessed whole towns and villages razed and civilians executed, conscripted for slave labour or deliberately made homeless. To break with this past, the Fourth Geneva Convention outlawed collective punishment and reprisals against non-combatants. How far away this all seems today. First in Gaza and now in southern Lebanon, the Israeli army has abandoned Geneva’s restraints, retaliating against the kidnapping of its soldiers by blowing up power plants, oil refineries, airports and roads.
As water and electricity supplies run low, humanitarian disaster beckons. Of course, the 1949 Geneva conference, remarkable though it was, certainly did not make collective punishment disappear, in either peace or war. In Stalin’s heyday, entire ethnic groups were deported from their homes in eastern Europe. In their colonies – from Malaya to Kenya – European powers still drew on collective punishment laws to face down armed nationalist insurgencies. In the 19th century, colonial policemen had relied on such decrees to combat cattle thieves and brigands. But there was a military application, too. Among “civilised” states, the laws of war ruled out collective punishment, or strictly limited it on the grounds of proportionality. Applied to small wars against racial “inferiors” in Africa and Asia, however, military men highlighted the need for “harsh, exemplary deterrence” among “savages” whose fanaticism would otherwise blind them to the superior force of their foe.
The significance of the idea of proportionality, on which the laws of war lay such stress, was thereby minimised, notably where the Middle East was concerned. In the 1920s the French shelled Damascus and the British dropped bombs on villages in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, the British brought their Collective Punishment Ordinance to Palestine. Following their departure, Israel, like other post-colonial states, found Britain’s approach to public order remained useful. In the occupied territories, in particular, its armed forces have over the years become addicted to collective punishment as a key weapon in the struggle against snipers, suicide bombings and missiles. Forced relocations, closures, curfews, house demolitions and the destruction of vineyards and orchards have become commonplace.
What started as a matter of collective fines has escalated into tank fire and aerial bombardment. Frustrated at the Israeli Defense Force’s inability to stop Hamas rocket attacks, a respected Israeli commentator now seriously proposes firing an artillery barrage at “a Palestinian locale” every time Israel is hit. The chief of the Israeli general staff, rather less anxious about international reaction than his defence minister, is reported to have wanted to “punish Lebanon and blast its civilian infrastructure back 20 years”. Thus, the principle of collective punishment has been extended to an entire country and threatens to precipitate a regional war.
But although the Israelis may be understandably frightened by the durability of their opponents and the range of their weaponry, they have not necessarily chosen the wisest response.
One reason for the virtual unanimity behind the 1949 Geneva prohibition on collective punishment in wartime was the sense that it was both morally unpalatable and militarily ineffective. Recent history suggested collective punishment usually played into the hands of well-organised and popular insurgencies. The latter may deliberately provoke it – as resistance groups frequently did in wartime Europe – because it often brings new recruits, weakens alternative sources of authority and discredits the perpetrators.
Like Tito’s Yugoslav partisans, militants can retreat and regroup, knowing that anything short of their total annihilation – almost impossible to achieve – will count as victory. Civilians in Gaza and Lebanon may blame Hamas and Hizbollah for provoking Israel but they will blame the Israelis as much if not more. As some of the politicians are well aware, because collective punishment on this scale receives little but condemnation internationally, it will intensify the diplomatic predicament of the Israeli state. This seems a high price to pay for allowing the IDF to flex its muscles.
Who will save civilians from their suffering, and Israel from itself? Not the US, which is paying the price for disengagement. America’s Middle Eastern allies are deeply worried but hamstrung. The threat of a US veto weakens the role of the United Nations Security Council and, because any success Washington may have in restraining Israel is likely to be kept private, it will recoup little credit for anything it does achieve. China is preoccupied with North Korea, and Russia has little leverage. That leaves the Europeans.
In spite of the fact that it is Israel’s number one trading partner, the European Union has still not managed to make its voice count. Yet a regional war will affect Europe more than the US, and the knock-on effects domestically will be incalculable. The Europeans now urgently need to force a ceasefire. With more power at their disposal over Israel in particular than they realise, they should draw once again on their own memories of occupation. The painful lessons that led them to Geneva are no less valid today than they were in 1949.
The writer is professor of history at Columbia University
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
By Mark Mazower
Yes I know I am an FT freak, but its quite an excellent paper...
Published: July 16 2006 18:51 | Last updated: July 16 2006 18:51
In 1949, Europeans spearheaded an international move to outlaw collective punishment. This came after two world wars in which they had witnessed whole towns and villages razed and civilians executed, conscripted for slave labour or deliberately made homeless. To break with this past, the Fourth Geneva Convention outlawed collective punishment and reprisals against non-combatants. How far away this all seems today. First in Gaza and now in southern Lebanon, the Israeli army has abandoned Geneva’s restraints, retaliating against the kidnapping of its soldiers by blowing up power plants, oil refineries, airports and roads.
As water and electricity supplies run low, humanitarian disaster beckons. Of course, the 1949 Geneva conference, remarkable though it was, certainly did not make collective punishment disappear, in either peace or war. In Stalin’s heyday, entire ethnic groups were deported from their homes in eastern Europe. In their colonies – from Malaya to Kenya – European powers still drew on collective punishment laws to face down armed nationalist insurgencies. In the 19th century, colonial policemen had relied on such decrees to combat cattle thieves and brigands. But there was a military application, too. Among “civilised” states, the laws of war ruled out collective punishment, or strictly limited it on the grounds of proportionality. Applied to small wars against racial “inferiors” in Africa and Asia, however, military men highlighted the need for “harsh, exemplary deterrence” among “savages” whose fanaticism would otherwise blind them to the superior force of their foe.
The significance of the idea of proportionality, on which the laws of war lay such stress, was thereby minimised, notably where the Middle East was concerned. In the 1920s the French shelled Damascus and the British dropped bombs on villages in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, the British brought their Collective Punishment Ordinance to Palestine. Following their departure, Israel, like other post-colonial states, found Britain’s approach to public order remained useful. In the occupied territories, in particular, its armed forces have over the years become addicted to collective punishment as a key weapon in the struggle against snipers, suicide bombings and missiles. Forced relocations, closures, curfews, house demolitions and the destruction of vineyards and orchards have become commonplace.
What started as a matter of collective fines has escalated into tank fire and aerial bombardment. Frustrated at the Israeli Defense Force’s inability to stop Hamas rocket attacks, a respected Israeli commentator now seriously proposes firing an artillery barrage at “a Palestinian locale” every time Israel is hit. The chief of the Israeli general staff, rather less anxious about international reaction than his defence minister, is reported to have wanted to “punish Lebanon and blast its civilian infrastructure back 20 years”. Thus, the principle of collective punishment has been extended to an entire country and threatens to precipitate a regional war.
But although the Israelis may be understandably frightened by the durability of their opponents and the range of their weaponry, they have not necessarily chosen the wisest response.
One reason for the virtual unanimity behind the 1949 Geneva prohibition on collective punishment in wartime was the sense that it was both morally unpalatable and militarily ineffective. Recent history suggested collective punishment usually played into the hands of well-organised and popular insurgencies. The latter may deliberately provoke it – as resistance groups frequently did in wartime Europe – because it often brings new recruits, weakens alternative sources of authority and discredits the perpetrators.
Like Tito’s Yugoslav partisans, militants can retreat and regroup, knowing that anything short of their total annihilation – almost impossible to achieve – will count as victory. Civilians in Gaza and Lebanon may blame Hamas and Hizbollah for provoking Israel but they will blame the Israelis as much if not more. As some of the politicians are well aware, because collective punishment on this scale receives little but condemnation internationally, it will intensify the diplomatic predicament of the Israeli state. This seems a high price to pay for allowing the IDF to flex its muscles.
Who will save civilians from their suffering, and Israel from itself? Not the US, which is paying the price for disengagement. America’s Middle Eastern allies are deeply worried but hamstrung. The threat of a US veto weakens the role of the United Nations Security Council and, because any success Washington may have in restraining Israel is likely to be kept private, it will recoup little credit for anything it does achieve. China is preoccupied with North Korea, and Russia has little leverage. That leaves the Europeans.
In spite of the fact that it is Israel’s number one trading partner, the European Union has still not managed to make its voice count. Yet a regional war will affect Europe more than the US, and the knock-on effects domestically will be incalculable. The Europeans now urgently need to force a ceasefire. With more power at their disposal over Israel in particular than they realise, they should draw once again on their own memories of occupation. The painful lessons that led them to Geneva are no less valid today than they were in 1949.
The writer is professor of history at Columbia University
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
posted by Germain at 23:39
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